The ideal Axis strategy

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
ljadw
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by ljadw » 27 Nov 2019 07:34

MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 22:08
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 21:56
MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:59
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:29
And without the consent of the Turks (who are not Arabs ) ,the Germans could not invade the ME .
Yes they could.
In post 60 Corbulo was talking about a German invasion of the ME via Turkey, not about the AK in NA . That's why I said that the Germans could not do it without the consent of Turkey .

[wall of words snipped to save bandwidth]
They could do it without the consent of Turkey. Or at least they could have tried. That's why they studied it and put together a tentative plan to attack Turkey.
An attack of Turkey had zero chances to succeed . The Germans needed the consent of Turkey,as they needed the consent of Spain to go to Gibraltar .

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Terry Duncan
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by Terry Duncan » 27 Nov 2019 10:27

Just a note, but can people try to use somewhat more than 'Yes they can' and 'No they cant' type posts as they add little to the discussion and tend to lead to repetition. If possible, use some data to try to show the other side wrong.

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ljadw
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by ljadw » 27 Nov 2019 10:57

In 1942 The Germans were working on a plan to invade Turkey with the help of Bulgary .Code name was Gertrud . It was very quickly abandoned for a lot of reasons: lack of resources ( where should the Germans get the needed forces? Blau claimed everything that was available ) .How would they supply these forces ?There was NO railway bridge over the Bosporus and the Turkish railways could not transport the needed dozens divisions . Today's car driving distance on today's roads and with today's cars from Istanbul to Damascus is 1527 km .It is easy to imagine what the difficulties would be almost 80 years ago .And an invasion of Turkey would have as result the occupation of Turkey which would tie dozens of divisions who were not available and an other result would be a guerilla war against the Germans .
And last question : WHY should they invade Turkey ?There was nothing in the ME that German could use .

corbulo
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by corbulo » 27 Nov 2019 11:37

ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 11:24
Problems : distance,bad railways,
Was the rail network that much better in Libya...?

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by corbulo » 27 Nov 2019 12:18

ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 21:56
MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:59
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:29
And without the consent of the Turks (who are not Arabs ) ,the Germans could not invade the ME .
Yes they could.
In post 60 Corbulo was talking about a German invasion of the ME via Turkey, not about the AK in NA . That's why I said that the Germans could not do it without the consent of Turkey .
And, as Turkey ( as Spain )would only join the Axis after the Axis had won, the whole scenario is irrelevant . Italy joined the Axis because Il Duce was convinced,wrongly, that Germany had won.Spain and Turkey would not make this mistake .Besides the scenario Corbulo is presenting would be a bad Axis strategy, even /especially if it succeeded : there was nothing in the ME except sand and camels, things the Germans did not need About the oil : the Germans could not use it and did not need it . Britain also did not need the oil of the ME .
The whole importance of the ME in WWII is something that has been transposed from 2019 to 1940 . There is a word for this ,but sadly enough I have lost it .You can't transpose the economic and political realities of 1940 to 2019 and vice versa .When Corbulo talks about a Turkish/Arab army of millions , he thinks on the today population of Turkey : 83 million, but he forget,or is unaware that 80 years ago the population of Turkey was 17.8 million .When he talks about the importance of the ME in 1940, he thinks on the oilfields of the Emirates,KSA, Irak,Iran. But in 1940 the oil production of the Emirates and KSA was insignifiant and that of Iraq was 3.4 million, lower than that of Germany which was 4.8 million ton .And, as a lot of people, he thinks that,because the economy of most countries is today running on oil, it was also so in 1940 ,while the truth is that in 1940 the economy of most countries was running on coal .
Oil is something very recent . In 1945 coal was still more important in the US than oil, in 1948 oil was good for only 10 % of the British Energy Mix .In 2000 ( 20 years ago only ) most electricity in Germany was produced by coal .In 1960 coal was still the number one in the US, not oil .
Youre right - oil production in areas like iraq, etc wasnt that high. It was bigger in the caucusus: baku, grozny, maikop etc, even Romania (i think). But i was talking about strategic reach. With a few panzer divisions (as well as popular local support) who could have stopped Germany from subduing Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq etc? Who coukd have stopped tbem from hitting Egypt/Suez from tbe 'wrong' side? Soviet oilfields in the caucusus were within easy reach from airfields in Turkey, Syria, Iraq etc in a German version of Operation Pike. Wirh the Near East subdued what would Persia have done? I think youre overstimating the importance of coal for war. Planes, tanks, motorised transports relied on petroleum products.

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by MarkN » 27 Nov 2019 12:54

ljadw wrote:
27 Nov 2019 07:34
MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 22:08
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 21:56
MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:59
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:29
And without the consent of the Turks (who are not Arabs ) ,the Germans could not invade the ME .
Yes they could.
In post 60 Corbulo was talking about a German invasion of the ME via Turkey, not about the AK in NA . That's why I said that the Germans could not do it without the consent of Turkey .

[wall of words snipped to save bandwidth]
They could do it without the consent of Turkey. Or at least they could have tried. That's why they studied it and put together a tentative plan to attack Turkey.
An attack of Turkey had zero chances to succeed . The Germans needed the consent of Turkey,as they needed the consent of Spain to go to Gibraltar .
The Germans did not need the consent of Luxembourg when they went to France in May 1940. They succeeded.
The Germans did not need the consent of Belgium when they went to France in May 1940. They succeeded.
OKH Document "Operation Anatolien ohne Einverstandnis der Turkei" was distrIbuted in July 1941.

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Terry Duncan
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by Terry Duncan » 27 Nov 2019 12:55

corbulo wrote:
27 Nov 2019 12:18
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 21:56
MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:59
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:29
And without the consent of the Turks (who are not Arabs ) ,the Germans could not invade the ME .
Yes they could.
In post 60 Corbulo was talking about a German invasion of the ME via Turkey, not about the AK in NA . That's why I said that the Germans could not do it without the consent of Turkey .
And, as Turkey ( as Spain )would only join the Axis after the Axis had won, the whole scenario is irrelevant . Italy joined the Axis because Il Duce was convinced,wrongly, that Germany had won.Spain and Turkey would not make this mistake .Besides the scenario Corbulo is presenting would be a bad Axis strategy, even /especially if it succeeded : there was nothing in the ME except sand and camels, things the Germans did not need About the oil : the Germans could not use it and did not need it . Britain also did not need the oil of the ME .
The whole importance of the ME in WWII is something that has been transposed from 2019 to 1940 . There is a word for this ,but sadly enough I have lost it .You can't transpose the economic and political realities of 1940 to 2019 and vice versa .When Corbulo talks about a Turkish/Arab army of millions , he thinks on the today population of Turkey : 83 million, but he forget,or is unaware that 80 years ago the population of Turkey was 17.8 million .When he talks about the importance of the ME in 1940, he thinks on the oilfields of the Emirates,KSA, Irak,Iran. But in 1940 the oil production of the Emirates and KSA was insignifiant and that of Iraq was 3.4 million, lower than that of Germany which was 4.8 million ton .And, as a lot of people, he thinks that,because the economy of most countries is today running on oil, it was also so in 1940 ,while the truth is that in 1940 the economy of most countries was running on coal .
Oil is something very recent . In 1945 coal was still more important in the US than oil, in 1948 oil was good for only 10 % of the British Energy Mix .In 2000 ( 20 years ago only ) most electricity in Germany was produced by coal .In 1960 coal was still the number one in the US, not oil .
Youre right - oil production in areas like iraq, etc wasnt that high. It was bigger in the caucusus: baku, grozny, maikop etc, even Romania (i think). But i was talking about strategic reach. With a few panzer divisions (as well as popular local support) who could have stopped Germany from subduing Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq etc? Who coukd have stopped tbem from hitting Egypt/Suez from tbe 'wrong' side? Soviet oilfields in the caucusus were within easy reach from airfields in Turkey, Syria, Iraq etc in a German version of Operation Pike. Wirh the Near East subdued what would Persia have done? I think youre overstimating the importance of coal for war. Planes, tanks, motorised transports relied on petroleum products.
Strategic reach is limited by logistical ability, this is one reason the desert was seesawed as the supply lines stretched. Germany relied a lot on erzatz products, one of which being fuel derived from coal, so it was important for them. Who could have stopped them hitting the Suez Canal from the far side? how about the same poor infrastructure that stalled the Ottoman attempt to do just that 25 or so years before, and that long delayed the British advance into the Levant. Also, the Germans will tend to be rather shorter on troops than the British Empire that does have access to the Indian Army if needed, the largest volunteer army ever raised. Britain has access to the world markets, Venezuala for oil as an example, Germany is limited. Drawing lines on maps is easy, but you will tend to run out of Germans quickly, and their allies were nowhere near as well equipped.

The ideal strategy is surely to gain what is possible with as little risk of war as possible, then consolidate for a considerable time, followed by a further expansion war if desired. Taking on Britain and France was high risk as just as with WWI there was no real plan for how to knock Britain out of the war, only the hope that the British would prove less willing to fight to the end than the Germans. Even with Soviet help, Poland was probably a step too far at the time. Hitler would have been better off forming a formal alliance with the remaining eastern European nations and taking time to arm them all whilst the international tensions subsided somewhat after the annexation of the Czech lands.

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Terry Duncan
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by Terry Duncan » 27 Nov 2019 12:56

MarkN wrote:
27 Nov 2019 12:54
ljadw wrote:
27 Nov 2019 07:34
MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 22:08
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 21:56
MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:59
Yes they could.
In post 60 Corbulo was talking about a German invasion of the ME via Turkey, not about the AK in NA . That's why I said that the Germans could not do it without the consent of Turkey .

[wall of words snipped to save bandwidth]
They could do it without the consent of Turkey. Or at least they could have tried. That's why they studied it and put together a tentative plan to attack Turkey.
An attack of Turkey had zero chances to succeed . The Germans needed the consent of Turkey,as they needed the consent of Spain to go to Gibraltar .
The Germans did not need the consent of Luxembourg when they went to France in May 1940. They succeeded.
The Germans did not need the consent of Belgium when they went to France in May 1940. They succeeded.
OKH Document "Operation Anatolien ohne Einverstandnis der Turkei" was distrIbuted in July 1941.
The Germans didnt need the consent of Turkey to invade it and move troops through it, but it probably did need Soviet consent to do so and that would likely not be forthcoming as it is totally against Soviet interests.

MarkN
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by MarkN » 27 Nov 2019 13:35

Terry Duncan wrote:
27 Nov 2019 12:56
The Germans didnt need the consent of Turkey to invade it and move troops through it, but it probably did need Soviet consent to do so and that would likely not be forthcoming as it is totally against Soviet interests.
To what extent is this discussion related to historical reality and how much to the imagination?

The series of documents l have were generated in July 1941 - after BARBAROSSA had begun. They are a study of a potential invasion that would commence after BARBAROSSA had been concluded successfully. Historically speaking, Soviet consent was irrelevant.

If this discussion is based upon an imagined timeframe before BARBAROSSA, or an imagined scenario where BARBAROSSA didn't occur, then it is likely the Germans and the Soviets would have jointly invaded and shared the spoils a la earlier Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

ljadw
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by ljadw » 27 Nov 2019 13:58

corbulo wrote:
27 Nov 2019 12:18
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 21:56
MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:59
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 20:29
And without the consent of the Turks (who are not Arabs ) ,the Germans could not invade the ME .
Yes they could.
In post 60 Corbulo was talking about a German invasion of the ME via Turkey, not about the AK in NA . That's why I said that the Germans could not do it without the consent of Turkey .
And, as Turkey ( as Spain )would only join the Axis after the Axis had won, the whole scenario is irrelevant . Italy joined the Axis because Il Duce was convinced,wrongly, that Germany had won.Spain and Turkey would not make this mistake .Besides the scenario Corbulo is presenting would be a bad Axis strategy, even /especially if it succeeded : there was nothing in the ME except sand and camels, things the Germans did not need About the oil : the Germans could not use it and did not need it . Britain also did not need the oil of the ME .
The whole importance of the ME in WWII is something that has been transposed from 2019 to 1940 . There is a word for this ,but sadly enough I have lost it .You can't transpose the economic and political realities of 1940 to 2019 and vice versa .When Corbulo talks about a Turkish/Arab army of millions , he thinks on the today population of Turkey : 83 million, but he forget,or is unaware that 80 years ago the population of Turkey was 17.8 million .When he talks about the importance of the ME in 1940, he thinks on the oilfields of the Emirates,KSA, Irak,Iran. But in 1940 the oil production of the Emirates and KSA was insignifiant and that of Iraq was 3.4 million, lower than that of Germany which was 4.8 million ton .And, as a lot of people, he thinks that,because the economy of most countries is today running on oil, it was also so in 1940 ,while the truth is that in 1940 the economy of most countries was running on coal .
Oil is something very recent . In 1945 coal was still more important in the US than oil, in 1948 oil was good for only 10 % of the British Energy Mix .In 2000 ( 20 years ago only ) most electricity in Germany was produced by coal .In 1960 coal was still the number one in the US, not oil .
Youre right - oil production in areas like iraq, etc wasnt that high. It was bigger in the caucusus: baku, grozny, maikop etc, even Romania (i think). But i was talking about strategic reach. With a few panzer divisions (as well as popular local support) who could have stopped Germany from subduing Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq etc? Who coukd have stopped tbem from hitting Egypt/Suez from tbe 'wrong' side? Soviet oilfields in the caucusus were within easy reach from airfields in Turkey, Syria, Iraq etc in a German version of Operation Pike. Wirh the Near East subdued what would Persia have done? I think youre overstimating the importance of coal for war. Planes, tanks, motorised transports relied on petroleum products.
Let's suppose that the Germans would start in Vienna :
Driving distance Vienna-Istanbul :1573 km
No railroad over the Bosporus
Distance Istanbul- Damascus : 1527 km
Distance Damascus-Suez Canal ?
It would be out of the question to send a mobile force of 15 divisions, 400000 men, 1000 tanks and 10000 trucks 4000 km away .
For the tanks only you need 100 trains
A lot of the railway roads were single track, the enemy would destroy them and also the bridges .

Aircraft, tanks ,trucks relied on petroleum, but the economy and the civiliand relied on coal .And without them, no war was possible .
About Romania : I would be a billionaire if I had received one euro every time I read that Germany had no oil and was depending for oil on Romania

German oil production
1940 : 4.8 million ton
1941 : 5,7 million ton
1942 : 6,6 million ton
1943 : 7,6 million ton
1944 : 5,6 million ton
Imports not included
And now Romania :Source : Krieg um Öl (Eichholtz )
1940 :6,6 million
1941 :5,8 million
1952 : 5.6 million
1943 :5,3 million
1944 : 3,5 million
German total : 30,3 million
Romanian total :26,8 million
Germany was the second oil producer in Europe,behind the SU and before Romania .
What else was there in the ME that could interest Germany ?

ljadw
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by ljadw » 27 Nov 2019 14:06

Terry Duncan wrote:
27 Nov 2019 12:56
MarkN wrote:
27 Nov 2019 12:54
ljadw wrote:
27 Nov 2019 07:34
MarkN wrote:
26 Nov 2019 22:08
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 21:56
In post 60 Corbulo was talking about a German invasion of the ME via Turkey, not about the AK in NA . That's why I said that the Germans could not do it without the consent of Turkey .

[wall of words snipped to save bandwidth]
They could do it without the consent of Turkey. Or at least they could have tried. That's why they studied it and put together a tentative plan to attack Turkey.
An attack of Turkey had zero chances to succeed . The Germans needed the consent of Turkey,as they needed the consent of Spain to go to Gibraltar .
The Germans did not need the consent of Luxembourg when they went to France in May 1940. They succeeded.
The Germans did not need the consent of Belgium when they went to France in May 1940. They succeeded.
OKH Document "Operation Anatolien ohne Einverstandnis der Turkei" was distrIbuted in July 1941.
The Germans didnt need the consent of Turkey to invade it and move troops through it, but it probably did need Soviet consent to do so and that would likely not be forthcoming as it is totally against Soviet interests.
To invade the ME, Germany had to pass through Turkey,and without the consent of Turkey it could not pass through Turkey .As Turkey would not give its consent , Germany would have to invade Turkey, something which would result in a catstrophe .
Operation Anatolien without Einverstandnis der Turkei does not mean that Germany had the intention to invade Turkey : the Germans had also a plan for an invasion of Ireland .
And what would be the benefit for Germany ? They could not invade the SU through the Caucasus, they could not go to Suez, they could not capture the oil fields of Iraq,which they also could not use .

ljadw
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by ljadw » 27 Nov 2019 14:15

MarkN wrote:
27 Nov 2019 13:35
Terry Duncan wrote:
27 Nov 2019 12:56
The Germans didnt need the consent of Turkey to invade it and move troops through it, but it probably did need Soviet consent to do so and that would likely not be forthcoming as it is totally against Soviet interests.
To what extent is this discussion related to historical reality and how much to the imagination?

The series of documents l have were generated in July 1941 - after BARBAROSSA had begun. They are a study of a potential invasion that would commence after BARBAROSSA had been concluded successfully. Historically speaking, Soviet consent was irrelevant.

If this discussion is based upon an imagined timeframe before BARBAROSSA, or an imagined scenario where BARBAROSSA didn't occur, then it is likely the Germans and the Soviets would have jointly invaded and shared the spoils a la earlier Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
A study about a POTENTIAL invasion is not something serious .
If britain gave up before Barbarossa,or during Barbarossa , why should Germany invade Turkey ?
If Barbarossa failed,the invasion would be impossible
If Barbarossa succeeded,the invasion would not be necessary,as the aim of Barbarossa was to force Britain to give up .
If Barbarossa would not force Britain to give up, why should an invasion of Turkey force Britain to give up ?
And there is no reason for the SU to invade Turkey : we know what happened when the SU invaded Afghanistan .

ljadw
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by ljadw » 27 Nov 2019 14:18

corbulo wrote:
27 Nov 2019 11:37
ljadw wrote:
26 Nov 2019 11:24
Problems : distance,bad railways,
Was the rail network that much better in Libya...?
It was even worse, but the Germans failed in Libya,although the Italians provided them with the needed oil and supplies .

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by MarkN » 27 Nov 2019 18:34

ljadw wrote:
27 Nov 2019 14:06
To invade the ME, Germany had to pass through Turkey,and without the consent of Turkey it could not pass through Turkey .As Turkey would not give its consent , Germany would have to invade Turkey, something which would result in a catstrophe .
To invade France, Germany didn't have to pass through Luxembourg and Belgium but chose to do so anyway. Without the consent of Luxembourg and Belgium it could not pass through Luxembourg and Belgium. As Luxembourg and Belgium would not give their consent , Germany would have to invade Luxembourg and Belgium, something which they did very successfully and very easily. They even invaded the Netherlands too just for good measure.

To invade Greece, Germany had to pass through Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and without the consent of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia it could not pass through Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria all gave their consent. Yugoslavia didn't, so Germany had to invade, which it did very successfully.

What makes Turkey such a special case?

MarkN
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by MarkN » 27 Nov 2019 18:41

ljadw wrote:
27 Nov 2019 14:06
Operation Anatolien without Einverstandnis der Turkei does not mean that Germany had the intention to invade Turkey : the Germans had also a plan for an invasion of Ireland .
They also had plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania and the Soviet Union. I guess they had no intention of invading them either.

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