The ideal Axis strategy

[HistoryGeek2019]

hence the Peter principle, Hitler had risen to the level of his incompetence with the fall of France; every strategic decision he made after that was wrong.

The problem is that it wasn't just Hitler. All of Germany's senior leadership believed they were a world power after the Fall of France. Unless Konrad Adenauer pulls a move from the Man in the High Castle and kills them all, Germany is going to embark on a self-destructive path of conquest no matter which wannabe warlord is in charge.

Hitler's strategic decisions after the fall of France were not wrong: they were dictated by the military situation ,reality was that in the late Summer of 1940 Germany's situation was hopeless ,desperate .

Yes, which is why Germany needed a leader like Konrad Adenauer who could make peace with the west. The Nazis and Prussian officer corps were delusional about Germany's power after the Fall of France.

[glenn239]

The problem is that it wasn't just Hitler. All of Germany's senior leadership believed they were a world power after the Fall of France. Unless Konrad Adenauer pulls a move from the Man in the High Castle and kills them all, Germany is going to embark on a self-destructive path of conquest no matter which wannabe warlord is in charge.

The navy wasn't keen on war with Russia, Goering didn't want it, the Italians didn't want it, and Army support, while it was there, wasn't universal. I believe it was Halder that penned the notation in his diary that it wasn't clear what strategic gain was to be expected in Russia, even assuming victory. With the diplomats, Ribbentrop was keen to cap his 1939 success with another Nazi-Soviet pact.

The core of Hitler's miscalculation seems threefold. First, he underestimated the military potential of the Soviet Union. Second, he overestimated the value of Japan as a counterweight to the USA. Third, he overrated the value of conquering the USSR for resources, given the impossibility of extracting meaningful quantities under war conditions and timelines. (That is to say, it was obvious that invading the SU would squander far more resources than Germany could hope to get out of the conquered territories in return).

Yes, which is why Germany needed a leader like Konrad Adenauer who could make peace with the west. The Nazis and Prussian officer corps were delusional about Germany's power after the Fall of France.

The complication , the dilemma for Germany was that there could be no peace with the west without an alliance with the Soviet Union against the west. In 1940, two political steps seemed logical for Germany. First, an alliance with France based on respect of France's great power status. This did not happen. Second, an alliance with the Soviet Union based on the objective of the total destruction of the British empire and its replacement with countries and governments suitable to the fancy of Germany and the Soviet Union. This also did not happen.

[glenn239]

Hitler's strategic decisions after the fall of France were not wrong: they were dictated by the military situation ,reality was that in the late Summer of 1940 Germany's situation was hopeless ,desperate .

Hitler destroyed Germany's chances with an unerring series of strategic decisions, all of them wrong, from mid-1940 onwards. Germany's position was not in the slightest desperate until it was clear in December 1941 that the biggest of these wrong decisions - Barbarossa - had failed - at nearly the exact moment that Hitler committed the catastrophe of declaring war on the United States.

[HistoryGeek2019]

The problem is that it wasn't just Hitler. All of Germany's senior leadership believed they were a world power after the Fall of France. Unless Konrad Adenauer pulls a move from the Man in the High Castle and kills them all, Germany is going to embark on a self-destructive path of conquest no matter which wannabe warlord is in charge.

The navy wasn't keen on war with Russia, Goering didn't want it, the Italians didn't want it, and Army support, while it was there, wasn't universal. I believe it was Halder that penned the notation in his diary that it wasn't clear what strategic gain was to be expected in Russia, even assuming victory. With the diplomats, Ribbentrop was keen to cap his 1939 success with another Nazi-Soviet pact.

The core of Hitler's miscalculation seems threefold. First, he underestimated the military potential of the Soviet Union. Second, he overestimated the value of Japan as a counterweight to the USA. Third, he overrated the value of conquering the USSR for resources, given the impossibility of extracting meaningful quantities under war conditions and timelines. (That is to say, it was obvious that invading the SU would squander far more resources than Germany could hope to get out of the conquered territories in return).

Yes, which is why Germany needed a leader like Konrad Adenauer who could make peace with the west. The Nazis and Prussian officer corps were delusional about Germany's power after the Fall of France.

The complication , the dilemma for Germany was that there could be no peace with the west without an alliance with the Soviet Union against the west. In 1940, two political steps seemed logical for Germany. First, an alliance with France based on respect of France's great power status. This did not happen. Second, an alliance with the Soviet Union based on the objective of the total destruction of the British empire and its replacement with countries and governments suitable to the fancy of Germany and the Soviet Union. This also did not happen.

Raeder and Goering might not have been keen on a war with Russia, but they weren't begging Hitler to make peace with the west either. Raeder was fantasizing about building a navy that could challenge Japan, which is just about as delusional as Brauchitsch and Halder's ambitions in Russia.

[glenn239]

Raeder and Goering might not have been keen on a war with Russia, but they weren't begging Hitler to make peace with the west either. Raeder was fantasizing about building a navy that could challenge Japan, which is just about as delusional as Brauchitsch and Halder's ambitions in Russia.

Had Hitler died in 1940 the question of his successor is open for debate, but Goering had a reasonable shot at it, and if he were calling the shots, I doubt Barbarossa happens.

[ljadw]

Hitler's strategic decisions after the fall of France were not wrong: they were dictated by the military situation ,reality was that in the late Summer of 1940 Germany's situation was hopeless ,desperate .

Hitler destroyed Germany's chances with an unerring series of strategic decisions, all of them wrong, from mid-1940 onwards. Germany's position was not in the slightest desperate until it was clear in December 1941 that the biggest of these wrong decisions - Barbarossa - had failed - at nearly the exact moment that Hitler committed the catastrophe of declaring war on the United States.

After Britain's decision to continue the war, Germany's chances to win to survive were decreasing every day .General time was working against Germany, that's why Hitler asked if Barbarossa was not possible in 1940 .
His DOW on the US was logical: he was forced by PH . It would be very stupid from Germany to do nothing while US were eliminating Japan ( this happened already in June 1942 ) and while US were sending LL supplies to Britain and France . Already a year before PH, Goebbels wrote in his diary that he expected war with the US at last in 1942 .If Germany did not declare war on the US on December 11 1941, it could never declare war on the US , but US would declare war on Germany at the first occasion .
There was only one possibility to delay war between US and Germany = when Germany would stop its submarine attacks against US/British MV who were sailing to Britain,protected by the US Navy .

[HistoryGeek2019]

Raeder and Goering might not have been keen on a war with Russia, but they weren't begging Hitler to make peace with the west either. Raeder was fantasizing about building a navy that could challenge Japan, which is just about as delusional as Brauchitsch and Halder's ambitions in Russia.

Had Hitler died in 1940 the question of his successor is open for debate, but Goering had a reasonable shot at it, and if he were calling the shots, I doubt Barbarossa happens.

That sounds right to me. Germany would have been much better off if it had kept the peace with Russia.

[glenn239]

After Britain's decision to continue the war, Germany's chances to win to survive were decreasing every day .General time was working against Germany, that's why Hitler asked if Barbarossa was not possible in 1940 .

The British strategy was in shambles on the Meuse in May 1940. That it was able to cobble together a replacement strategy owed as much to Hitler's unforced errors as it did to British resilience.

His DOW on the US was logical: he was forced by PH . It would be very stupid from Germany to do nothing while US were eliminating Japan ( this happened already in June 1942 ) and while US were sending LL supplies to Britain and France .

Germany's strategic requirement to avoid war with the US did not disappear in a poof of rationalisation if and when Japan went to war.

Already a year before PH, Goebbels wrote in his diary that he expected war with the US at last in 1942 .If Germany did not declare war on the US on December 11 1941, it could never declare war on the US , but US would declare war on Germany at the first occasion .

The origins of the German error in policy with Japan was in promoting a Pacific clash with various diplomatic and military actions long before Pearl Harbor. Hitler's calculation was that Japan could somehow form a counterweight to US strength. Yet more evidence that Hitler was completely unhinged in decision making the moment the tarot cards pointed against whatever violent nonsense he was thinking of.

There was only one possibility to delay war between US and Germany = when Germany would stop its submarine attacks against US/British MV who were sailing to Britain,protected by the US Navy .

As per above, the easiest way for Germany to delay war between Japan and the USA was not to attack the USSR in the first place. In terms of Germany's policy towards the US, the second option was to seek an alliance with the USSR, to the purpose of completely eliminating the British Empire such that if the US entered the war it would face the one coalition that even it could not defeat - Germany, USSR, Italy, Japan.

[ljadw]

The USSR would never ally with Germany to eliminate Britain . Never .Besides, if it did, its help would be meaningless .

[ljadw]

That sounds right to me. Germany would have been much better off if it had kept the peace with Russia.
[/quote]

Why ?

[ljadw]

The British strategy was in shambles on the Meuse in May 1940. That it was able to cobble together a replacement strategy owed as much to Hitler's unforced errors as it did to British resilience.

As per above, the easiest way for Germany to delay war between Japan and the USA was not to attack the USSR in the first place. In terms of Germany's policy towards the US, the second option was to seek an alliance with the USSR, to the purpose of completely eliminating the British Empire such that if the US entered the war it would face the one coalition that even it could not defeat - Germany, USSR, Italy, Japan.
[/quote]

British strategy was not in shambles :in July 1940 it said no to Hitler's peace proposal, because it was certain of the intervention of the US and because it was hoping on the intervention of the USSR .
And Barbarossa had no influence at all on the Japanese decision in November 1941 to attack the USA .This decision was caused by the US decision to stop oil deliveries to Japan, resulting in the Japanese decision to attack the DEI,as this invasion would cause war with the US, Japan decided to eliminate first the US Pacific Fleet .
Besides, already before Barbarossa Japan had signed a non aggression treaty with the SU .

[glenn239]

The USSR would never ally with Germany to eliminate Britain . Never .Besides, if it did, its help would be meaningless .

The USSR didn't want to turn the European Empires in Asia and Africa communist? I've clearly misunderstood the entire basis of Soviet policy in the Cold War!

Next, you say a Soviet enemy would be 'meaningless' for Britain? I get the feeling with these discussions that there is an unreality about the thread by which the British Empire was hanging in 1940. You think that if the Red Army with 70 or 100 divisions came into the Middle East and Iran in 1940 with the purpose of ejecting the British from the entire region that the British Empire stood a snowball's chance?

[glenn239]

British strategy was not in shambles :in July 1940 it said no to Hitler's peace proposal, because it was certain of the intervention of the US and because it was hoping on the intervention of the USSR .

British policy was in shambles with the collapse of France. The entire basis of strategy in the 1939 decision for war had been swept away. It was Hitler as much as it was Churchill that undid this vacuum and put the British back into the driver's seat by late 1942.

And Barbarossa had no influence at all on the Japanese decision in November 1941 to attack the USA .This decision was caused by the US decision to stop oil deliveries to Japan.

Japan could not contemplate war to the south if the USSR was not accounted for; it was Barbarossa against the SU that allowed for the occupation of Southern Indochina in July 1941. That occupation, that does not occur without Barbarossa, set events in motion with the USA and Japan.

Besides, already before Barbarossa Japan had signed a non aggression treaty with the SU .

Maybe, but without Barbarossa threatening in the west, Stalin has no need of a non-aggression pact with Japan in 1941.

[Terry Duncan]

The USSR would never ally with Germany to eliminate Britain . Never .Besides, if it did, its help would be meaningless .

The USSR didn't want to turn the European Empires in Asia and Africa communist? I've clearly misunderstood the entire basis of Soviet policy in the Cold War!

Next, you say a Soviet enemy would be 'meaningless' for Britain? I get the feeling with these discussions that there is an unreality about the thread by which the British Empire was hanging in 1940. You think that if the Red Army with 70 or 100 divisions came into the Middle East and Iran in 1940 with the purpose of ejecting the British from the entire region that the British Empire stood a snowball's chance?

Prior to WWII the USSR mostly looked inwards, Stalin was quite happy(?) killing off potential rivals and securing his position. It was Trotsky who wanted international socialism, Stalin was happy to limit the revolution to Russia. WWII changed that outlook.

[ljadw]

The USSR would never ally with Germany to eliminate Britain . Never .Besides, if it did, its help would be meaningless .

The USSR didn't want to turn the European Empires in Asia and Africa communist? I've clearly misunderstood the entire basis of Soviet policy in the Cold War!

Next, you say a Soviet enemy would be 'meaningless' for Britain? I get the feeling with these discussions that there is an unreality about the thread by which the British Empire was hanging in 1940. You think that if the Red Army with 70 or 100 divisions came into the Middle East and Iran in 1940 with the purpose of ejecting the British from the entire region that the British Empire stood a snowball's chance?

1 There was no Cold War in 1940
2 It was impossible for the SU to intervene in the ME with 100 divisions because of logistical reasons : no country could operate in the ME with 100 divisions .
3 There was no reason for Stalin to occupy a big region inhabited by anti communist Muslims : see what happened in Afghanistan ,besides Stalin had already enough troubles with the Muslims in the SU .

4 Stalin had no 100 divisions available in 1940 .