The ideal Axis strategy

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pugsville
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by pugsville » 29 Nov 2019 23:01

JAG13 wrote:
29 Nov 2019 14:59
Please explain how being polonized by Germany and the USSR is in Turkey's interest.
Allowing another Nation to enter your Nation with Military forces on the basis of threats is to surrender sovereignty. It's to avoid this very possibility..

The Poles would not allow it. in 1938-9. The Belgians in 1914.
JAG13 wrote:
29 Nov 2019 04:05
Yes, as I told you from the start, there are conflicting views...

The first source is Papen, the second one is von Ribbentrop who hated Papen and sent him away from Berlin and did all he could to discredit him thereafter, to the absurd point of claiming that von Papen was opposing his own ideas, after all von Papen put Turkey above Italy constantly as a potential ally and clashed with Ciano when he proposed Italy return at least some of the Dodecanese islands to Turkey.

Source? You can read it in the some book I gave you the link for and you keep quoting...
And you are reading just one of two the conflicting and unreconciled accounts as 100% FACT. This is fundamental misrepresentation of what the book says.


I

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by JAG13 » 29 Nov 2019 23:53

pugsville wrote:
29 Nov 2019 23:01
JAG13 wrote:
29 Nov 2019 14:59
Please explain how being polonized by Germany and the USSR is in Turkey's interest.
Allowing another Nation to enter your Nation with Military forces on the basis of threats is to surrender sovereignty. It's to avoid this very possibility..
Yep, much better to simply call their bluff and make them invade and end you as an independent country in a bloodbath that would include a bit of retribution for past genocide...
The Poles would not allow it. in 1938-9. The Belgians in 1914.
The Poles? They had allies... and how did THAT work for them? Their allies didnt move a finger... who would move a finger for Turkey?

The Belgians were in the middle and whoever invaded them in the end, the other side would pretend to support them, who was going to support Turkey?

In this scenario Germany and France/USSR would polonize Belgium/Turkey...

The Turks werent too concerned with sovereignty it seems when they allowed those trains with weapons to go through Turkey... or when they let Axis shipping though the straits... maybe they just valued their skins a bit more than you suppose.
And you are reading just one of two the conflicting and unreconciled accounts as 100% FACT. This is fundamental misrepresentation of what the book says.


I
It is know from several sources, including Ciano, that von Papen wanted Turkey in the Axis and tried to have Italy return the island of Castelorosso to Turkey for starters (Ciano claimed it was a vital base against Alexandria), that supports his claim and shows him advancing the idea, all the champagne salesman has is his writings claiming it was his idea and that his rival von Papen was against it... hard to decide which one is telling the truth, isnt it?

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by pugsville » 30 Nov 2019 00:05

JAG13 wrote:
29 Nov 2019 23:53
It is know from several sources, including Ciano, that von Papen wanted Turkey in the Axis and tried to have Italy return the island of Castelorosso to Turkey for starters (Ciano claimed it was a vital base against Alexandria), that supports his claim and shows him advancing the idea, all the champagne salesman has is his writings claiming it was his idea and that his rival von Papen was against it... hard to decide which one is telling the truth, isnt it?
So there is no source that unequivocally supports your claim that the turkeys were just haggling about the price.

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by pugsville » 30 Nov 2019 00:11

JAG13 wrote:
29 Nov 2019 23:53
[
The Poles? They had allies... and how did THAT work for them? Their allies didnt move a finger... who would move a finger for Turkey?

The Belgians were in the middle and whoever invaded them in the end, the other side would pretend to support them, who was going to support Turkey?

In this scenario Germany and France/USSR would polonize Belgium/Turkey...

The Turks werent too concerned with sovereignty it seems when they allowed those trains with weapons to go through Turkey... or when they let Axis shipping though the straits... maybe they just valued their skins a bit more than you suppose.
Nations are not necessarily 100% rational about these things. They often choose to fight regardless. The Poles placed little faith in the western allies.

Shipping of objects is fundamentally different from formations of troops. Objects are not armed forces.
You can't just say one will be allowed therefore the other will be.

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by JAG13 » 30 Nov 2019 00:53

pugsville wrote:
30 Nov 2019 00:11
JAG13 wrote:
29 Nov 2019 23:53
[
The Poles? They had allies... and how did THAT work for them? Their allies didnt move a finger... who would move a finger for Turkey?

The Belgians were in the middle and whoever invaded them in the end, the other side would pretend to support them, who was going to support Turkey?

In this scenario Germany and France/USSR would polonize Belgium/Turkey...

The Turks werent too concerned with sovereignty it seems when they allowed those trains with weapons to go through Turkey... or when they let Axis shipping though the straits... maybe they just valued their skins a bit more than you suppose.
Nations are not necessarily 100% rational about these things. They often choose to fight regardless. The Poles placed little faith in the western allies.

Shipping of objects is fundamentally different from formations of troops. Objects are not armed forces.
You can't just say one will be allowed therefore the other will be.
The Poles had allies, a single enemy and therefore hope, the Turks would have had none of those...

So, your point is that the Turks might have been irrational and would have done what you want them to do... ok.

The source is Papen and his memoirs, also Ciano's, and you clearly do not know anything about Ribbentrop and his feud with Papen, dont you? Ciano confirms Papen was personally pushing for a deal with Turkey, that makes clear how valid Ribbentrop's autorship claims of the whole thing were...

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by pugsville » 30 Nov 2019 06:39

JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 00:53
[

The Poles had allies, a single enemy and therefore hope, the Turks would have had none of those...

So, your point is that the Turks might have been irrational and would have done what you want them to do... ok.
The Turks could really expect some support form British, they already had down some arms deal and the intervention in Greece was demonstration that the British would try. It would require a pretty significant effort to roll the Turks and it would take time.
JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 00:53
The source is Papen and his memoirs, also Ciano's, and you clearly do not know anything about Ribbentrop and his feud with Papen, dont you? Ciano confirms Papen was personally pushing for a deal with Turkey, that makes clear how valid Ribbentrop's autorship claims of the whole thing were...
Punishing for deal and getting one is two different things.

source page number quote. You got a source free free to provide it.

However lets move post this point

What the rough Timeline. When would the Pressure be put on, what the point of divergence.

(a) If the Turks resist what sort of force would be required and how long to effectively finish the campaign given reasonable British assistance.

(b) if the Turks do a deal what sort of force is envisaged, what is the strategic goal, and what is the time frame from achieving it?

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by JAG13 » 30 Nov 2019 18:01

pugsville wrote:
30 Nov 2019 06:39
JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 00:53
[

The Poles had allies, a single enemy and therefore hope, the Turks would have had none of those...

So, your point is that the Turks might have been irrational and would have done what you want them to do... ok.
The Turks could really expect some support form British, they already had down some arms deal and the intervention in Greece was demonstration that the British would try. It would require a pretty significant effort to roll the Turks and it would take time.
Lol! You are not serious, are you?

The UK first refused to take produce as payment for weapons demanding sterling instead, then demanded the Turks stop trading with Germany for weapons while refusing to buy the products they were selling to the Germans... then they finally agreed to give them a loan to buy weapons, but ONLY FROM THE UK, at which point they both, refused to sell them weapons since the UK lacked spare production and also refused to allow them to use the loan to buy from anyone else... cant tell you how thrilled the Turks were about UK support! :lol:

...and that was BEFORE Dunkirk.

Some weapons were promised in the end, mostly French, few arrived before the French collapse ended that particular soap opera.

Yeah, the Turks were very impressed on UK military prowess, kicked out of Norway, France, Greece, Libya and Crete, I am pretty sure the Turks would have been reassured that whatever few stragglers the UK could muster would make German/Soviet defeat a certainty...
JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 00:53
The source is Papen and his memoirs, also Ciano's, and you clearly do not know anything about Ribbentrop and his feud with Papen, dont you? Ciano confirms Papen was personally pushing for a deal with Turkey, that makes clear how valid Ribbentrop's autorship claims of the whole thing were...
Punishing for deal and getting one is two different things.

source page number quote. You got a source free free to provide it.

However lets move post this point

What the rough Timeline. When would the Pressure be put on, what the point of divergence.

(a) If the Turks resist what sort of force would be required and how long to effectively finish the campaign given reasonable British assistance.

(b) if the Turks do a deal what sort of force is envisaged, what is the strategic goal, and what is the time frame from achieving it?
Nah, why move ahead when you have already accepted the Turks would have to be irrational to go to war with Germany and the USSR, that is enough for me. :wink:

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by thaddeus_c » 30 Nov 2019 21:50

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
28 Nov 2019 16:29
thaddeus_c wrote:
28 Nov 2019 14:20
a quote from another thread

" Sealing off the "roof"of the Caucasus from the remainder of the Soviet Union, along with the existing possession of the Ukraine would have lost Stalin 70% of his coal,85-90% of his oil, and 50-60% of his food supply, along with large iron and manganese deposits ! He was SUNK! And the germans would have had a river based defense line they could hold. That this was THE WAR WINNER" viewtopic.php?f=66&t=78524&start=90

this was part of my point about clearing the Soviets from the Baltic and Black Seas, it relieves their own transportation problems, but also puts them right on top of key points.

in the north they would be on top of the major Lend Lease route for the critical first year.
Germany didn't have the logistical capability to supply a large enough army far enough east in order to seal off either the Caucasus or the northern lend lease route. Their OTL logistics weren't enough to keep their OTL armies supplied at their OTL distances. Believe it or not, the German high command actually knew what they were talking about when they said the Red Army needed to be destroyed west of the Dvina-Dnieper line. Anything beyond that range was beyond the ability of the poor roads and railroads of the Soviet Union to support.

Maybe the ideal Germany strategy was to stay to the west of the D-D line and hope Stalin was foolish enough to keep hurling all of his armies as far west as possible, which is basically what he did throughout the first year of the war. Germany mistakenly thought the Red Army would try to retreat into the Russian interior, when in fact it kept attacking to the west again and again.
you are comparing their OTL logistics with the scenario I proposed of using the Baltic and Black Seas and predicting the same result?

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by thaddeus_c » 30 Nov 2019 21:59

ljadw wrote:
29 Nov 2019 07:21
thaddeus_c wrote:
28 Nov 2019 14:20
a quote from another thread

" Sealing off the "roof"of the Caucasus from the remainder of the Soviet Union, along with the existing possession of the Ukraine would have lost Stalin 70% of his coal,85-90% of his oil, and 50-60% of his food supply, along with large iron and manganese deposits ! He was SUNK! And the germans would have had a river based defense line they could hold. That this was THE WAR WINNER" viewtopic.php?f=66&t=78524&start=90

this was part of my point about clearing the Soviets from the Baltic and Black Seas, it relieves their own transportation problems, but also puts them right on top of key points.

in the north they would be on top of the major Lend Lease route for the critical first year.
The Caucasus oil was not a war winner :the German experts warned that it was totally uncertain and unproved that the fall of the Caucasus would result in the collaps of the SU .
Some reasons :
1 90 % of the oil production before the war is not 90% of the oil production during the war
2 Even more important : the SU needed less oil during the war than before the war ,because before the war most oil was used by the civilian sector and during the war the civilian sector used much less oil and also coal and used wood .
The figures of the Soviet energy mix are well known :
before the war they were :
oil : 18,7 %
wood : 20 %
coal + gas : 61 %
in 1945 :
oil : 15 %
wood : 50 %
coal + gas : 35 %
Thus it is not so that the loss of the main prewar oil and coal resources would result in the fall of the SU .
For food : it is the same : the loss of 50% of the prewar food supply does not mean that during the war people would have 50% less to eat .During the war, Britain imported much less food, but that did not result in a famine,it was the opposite : the average Briton was better feed during the war than before the war,because the domestic food production replaced the lost food imports .
You underestimate the ingeniosity of people if they have to survive : during the war everyone ,including thoose in the cities,were farmers .
this thread is for the ideal Axis strategy, my speculation is that the best that THEY could do is park on the critical points of Leningrad and Rostov-on-Don.

your point(s), as near as I can understand them, is that the loss of their oil, coal, and food producing areas (the main ones) is going to prove useless due to wood and backyard gardens?

HistoryGeek2019
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 30 Nov 2019 23:28

thaddeus_c wrote:
30 Nov 2019 21:50
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
28 Nov 2019 16:29
thaddeus_c wrote:
28 Nov 2019 14:20
a quote from another thread

" Sealing off the "roof"of the Caucasus from the remainder of the Soviet Union, along with the existing possession of the Ukraine would have lost Stalin 70% of his coal,85-90% of his oil, and 50-60% of his food supply, along with large iron and manganese deposits ! He was SUNK! And the germans would have had a river based defense line they could hold. That this was THE WAR WINNER" viewtopic.php?f=66&t=78524&start=90

this was part of my point about clearing the Soviets from the Baltic and Black Seas, it relieves their own transportation problems, but also puts them right on top of key points.

in the north they would be on top of the major Lend Lease route for the critical first year.
Germany didn't have the logistical capability to supply a large enough army far enough east in order to seal off either the Caucasus or the northern lend lease route. Their OTL logistics weren't enough to keep their OTL armies supplied at their OTL distances. Believe it or not, the German high command actually knew what they were talking about when they said the Red Army needed to be destroyed west of the Dvina-Dnieper line. Anything beyond that range was beyond the ability of the poor roads and railroads of the Soviet Union to support.

Maybe the ideal Germany strategy was to stay to the west of the D-D line and hope Stalin was foolish enough to keep hurling all of his armies as far west as possible, which is basically what he did throughout the first year of the war. Germany mistakenly thought the Red Army would try to retreat into the Russian interior, when in fact it kept attacking to the west again and again.
you are comparing their OTL logistics with the scenario I proposed of using the Baltic and Black Seas and predicting the same result?
Sorry, you're right. I was responding to the first part of your post without piecing it together with your plan to seal off the Baltic and Black Seas. That might have helped German logistics to the point that the Germans could have advanced farther in the north and south, possibly denying lend-lease through Murmansk and the Caucasus. Although, for the Caucasus, didn't the lend-lease go through the port of Baku, and then up the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, and from there up the Volga? I don't think there was a north-south railway connecting Persia to Astrakhan or Stalingrad. It seems then the only way to cut off lend-lease from Persia would be to take Stalingrad, and maybe even Astrakhan.

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by pugsville » 01 Dec 2019 04:10

JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 18:01
[

The UK first refused to take produce as payment for weapons demanding sterling instead, then demanded the Turks stop trading with Germany for weapons while refusing to buy the products they were selling to the Germans... then they finally agreed to give them a loan to buy weapons, but ONLY FROM THE UK, at which point they both, refused to sell them weapons since the UK lacked spare production and also refused to allow them to use the loan to buy from anyone else... cant tell you how thrilled the Turks were about UK support! :lol:

...and that was BEFORE Dunkirk.

Some weapons were promised in the end, mostly French, few arrived before the French collapse ended that particular soap opera.

Yeah, the Turks were very impressed on UK military prowess, kicked out of Norway, France, Greece, Libya and Crete, I am pretty sure the Turks would have been reassured that whatever few stragglers the UK could muster would make German/Soviet defeat a certainty...
Source for these claims.

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by pugsville » 01 Dec 2019 05:35

JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 18:01


Lol! You are not serious, are you?

The UK first refused to take produce as payment for weapons demanding sterling instead, then demanded the Turks stop trading with Germany for weapons while refusing to buy the products they were selling to the Germans... then they finally agreed to give them a loan to buy weapons, but ONLY FROM THE UK, at which point they both, refused to sell them weapons since the UK lacked spare production and also refused to allow them to use the loan to buy from anyone else... cant tell you how thrilled the Turks were about UK support! :lol:

...and that was BEFORE Dunkirk.

Some weapons were promised in the end, mostly French, few arrived before the French collapse ended that particular soap opera.

Yeah, the Turks were very impressed on UK military prowess, kicked out of Norway, France, Greece, Libya and Crete, I am pretty sure the Turks would have been reassured that whatever few stragglers the UK could muster would make German/Soviet defeat a certainty...
Arms deliveries to the Turks. Yes more were promised and not delivered. But they dleeivered a greater percentages than teh German orders which were basically not delivered at all (pre war orders for me109s, submairnes)

Pre war amrs agreement 25 million pounds credit. A lot delivered after the Turks did not stand by the word of their treaty. Britian Delievred isgnificnat amounts of arms despite being desperate need for it;'s own defense.

2 Destroyers March 1941
2 Submarines in April 1942
2 minesweepers in dec 1939
2 minelayers in jan 1941
8 sub chasers in jan1941
10 MTBs june 1941
1000 mines April 1940
120 mines for submaines june 1941
500 depthcharges april 1940
82 torpedoes dec 1941

3 spitfires jan 1941
36 Blenheims may 1940
7 Lysanders april 1940
6 Avro Ansons may 1940
30 Fairly battles apr 1940
30 Hurricanes april 1940
30 Moprane Collenz 406a April 1940
1 Wellington jan 1941

24 240mm guns Aug 1939
190 25m ATG may 1940
24 Boffors AA guns 24 dec 1939
4 3.7 AA gun static may 1940
8 3.7 AA gun mobile April1940
24 155mm howitzers Aug 1939
12 105mm guns Aug 1939
18 pd guns may 1940
100 R,.35 tanks Aprl 1940
50 MkVIB light tanks feb 1940
12 Armored cars may 1940
200 Bots AT rifles sep 1939
5000 Hotchkiss LMGs sep 1939
1250 Vickers MGs feb 1940
25000 lebel rifles may 1940
500,000 grenades spring 1940
200 81mm Mortars spring 1940
400,000 gas marks.

pugsville
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by pugsville » 01 Dec 2019 05:47

Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality
von Selim Deringil

page 121
" In the course of negotiations von Papen had to convince Ribbentropp that unlimited tranist facilities were a vain dream, and pointed out to his Minister that the Turks refused any obligation aimed against Britain"
...
"Turkish resistance to arms transit exasperated Ribbentrop who felt the Turks should know that Germany was in a position to 'blot out the Turkish state in a few weeks'"

page 129
"Moreover the Turkish side told the Germans that they that would refuse to breach their contract with Britain and no deliveries could be made till 1943"

This is septemeber 1941.

ljadw
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by ljadw » 01 Dec 2019 09:20

thaddeus_c wrote:
30 Nov 2019 21:59
ljadw wrote:
29 Nov 2019 07:21
thaddeus_c wrote:
28 Nov 2019 14:20
a quote from another thread

" Sealing off the "roof"of the Caucasus from the remainder of the Soviet Union, along with the existing possession of the Ukraine would have lost Stalin 70% of his coal,85-90% of his oil, and 50-60% of his food supply, along with large iron and manganese deposits ! He was SUNK! And the germans would have had a river based defense line they could hold. That this was THE WAR WINNER" viewtopic.php?f=66&t=78524&start=90

this was part of my point about clearing the Soviets from the Baltic and Black Seas, it relieves their own transportation problems, but also puts them right on top of key points.

in the north they would be on top of the major Lend Lease route for the critical first year.
The Caucasus oil was not a war winner :the German experts warned that it was totally uncertain and unproved that the fall of the Caucasus would result in the collaps of the SU .
Some reasons :
1 90 % of the oil production before the war is not 90% of the oil production during the war
2 Even more important : the SU needed less oil during the war than before the war ,because before the war most oil was used by the civilian sector and during the war the civilian sector used much less oil and also coal and used wood .
The figures of the Soviet energy mix are well known :
before the war they were :
oil : 18,7 %
wood : 20 %
coal + gas : 61 %
in 1945 :
oil : 15 %
wood : 50 %
coal + gas : 35 %
Thus it is not so that the loss of the main prewar oil and coal resources would result in the fall of the SU .
For food : it is the same : the loss of 50% of the prewar food supply does not mean that during the war people would have 50% less to eat .During the war, Britain imported much less food, but that did not result in a famine,it was the opposite : the average Briton was better feed during the war than before the war,because the domestic food production replaced the lost food imports .
You underestimate the ingeniosity of people if they have to survive : during the war everyone ,including thoose in the cities,were farmers .
this thread is for the ideal Axis strategy, my speculation is that the best that THEY could do is park on the critical points of Leningrad and Rostov-on-Don.

your point(s), as near as I can understand them, is that the loss of their oil, coal, and food producing areas (the main ones) is going to prove useless due to wood and backyard gardens?
No : my point is that the loss of parts of their oil,coal and food production areas would on itself not be decisice, as what is more important are not the production figures, but the need and consumption figures .
Take oil : the fact that before the war 90% of the Soviet oil was produced in the Caucasus, is meaningless ,because
a the Caucasian oil had less importance during the war than before the war ,as a part of it was replaced by new oil fields
b and that is what a lot of people of the present generation are unable to understand : during the war the SU needed oil, BUT LESS oil than before the war : in 1945 the Soviets were in Berlin, but their oil production was only 60 % of that from 1940 .
Without oil they would not be in Berlin in 1945 but it is possible that they would in Berlin with an oil production lower than that of 1945 .
We don't know how much oil the Soviets needed during the war ,we can only guess .in 1940 the production was 33 million , in 1945 it was 19 million .The minimum needs were something between 1 million and less than 19 million .
That's why it is wrong to say that the capture of the Caucasian oil fields would be a war winner .
It is the same for the U Boat war : Britain needed imports during the war, but LESS than before the war,because a lot of imports could be cancelled without negative consequences and other imports could/were replaced by domestic production .

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

Post by JAG13 » 01 Dec 2019 16:49

pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019 05:35
JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 18:01


Lol! You are not serious, are you?

The UK first refused to take produce as payment for weapons demanding sterling instead, then demanded the Turks stop trading with Germany for weapons while refusing to buy the products they were selling to the Germans... then they finally agreed to give them a loan to buy weapons, but ONLY FROM THE UK, at which point they both, refused to sell them weapons since the UK lacked spare production and also refused to allow them to use the loan to buy from anyone else... cant tell you how thrilled the Turks were about UK support! :lol:

...and that was BEFORE Dunkirk.

Some weapons were promised in the end, mostly French, few arrived before the French collapse ended that particular soap opera.

Yeah, the Turks were very impressed on UK military prowess, kicked out of Norway, France, Greece, Libya and Crete, I am pretty sure the Turks would have been reassured that whatever few stragglers the UK could muster would make German/Soviet defeat a certainty...
Arms deliveries to the Turks. Yes more were promised and not delivered. But they dleeivered a greater percentages than teh German orders which were basically not delivered at all (pre war orders for me109s, submairnes)

Pre war amrs agreement 25 million pounds credit. A lot delivered after the Turks did not stand by the word of their treaty. Britian Delievred isgnificnat amounts of arms despite being desperate need for it;'s own defense.

2 Destroyers March 1941
2 Submarines in April 1942
2 minesweepers in dec 1939
2 minelayers in jan 1941
8 sub chasers in jan1941
10 MTBs june 1941
1000 mines April 1940
120 mines for submaines june 1941
500 depthcharges april 1940
82 torpedoes dec 1941

3 spitfires jan 1941
36 Blenheims may 1940
7 Lysanders april 1940
6 Avro Ansons may 1940
30 Fairly battles apr 1940
30 Hurricanes april 1940
30 Moprane Collenz 406a April 1940
1 Wellington jan 1941

24 240mm guns Aug 1939
190 25m ATG may 1940
24 Boffors AA guns 24 dec 1939
4 3.7 AA gun static may 1940
8 3.7 AA gun mobile April1940
24 155mm howitzers Aug 1939
12 105mm guns Aug 1939
18 pd guns may 1940
100 R,.35 tanks Aprl 1940
50 MkVIB light tanks feb 1940
12 Armored cars may 1940
200 Bots AT rifles sep 1939
5000 Hotchkiss LMGs sep 1939
1250 Vickers MGs feb 1940
25000 lebel rifles may 1940
500,000 grenades spring 1940
200 81mm Mortars spring 1940
400,000 gas marks.
Good, I see you finally looked at the sources I gave you, now put the "required" and "promised" columns as well to see how little it really was in context...

If the Brits didnt provide weapons TUrkey would need to go to the Germans for them, it wasnt "honor"...

Fun extra:

"One last thing needs to be recorded under the rubric 'material
assistance'. Much of the material sent to the Turks, the British
were embarrassed to discover, arrived in non-servicable condition.

There were several reasons for this. One was the British practice
of shipping aIl material of a kind together without reference to
associated items. Thus, British guns would arrive in Turkey on one
ship, with the vessel carrying the tractors required to move them
some distance behind. 259 Even worse, fragile items, such as range
finders, gyroscopes, and vision equipment, arrived in boxes not
marked "fragile" (kolay kiril.ir) and were often broken by Turkish
dockers.

Another problem with shipped material, was that in the haste
to get to the Turks those few things available, items were often
shipped incomplete. This was most catastrophically so in the case
of the Bristol Blenheims shipped to Turkey in 1939. First of all,
these Blenheims did not come with Beaufighter conversion kits. They
were Bombers, not Fighters as the Turks had wished. But even worse,
on arrival, it was discovered that these aircraft were not even
functional Bombers. Eighteen of the thirty lacked bomber seats,
bomb racks, and bomb winches. Twenty-eight had neither 250lb or
500lb bOmb racks. None of the aircraft had gun turrets, bomb
relea&es, sighting mechanism, machine-gun trigger sets, or oxygen
equipments. "It is most illogical and unsatisfactory" noted
Colville, "that when, at some sacrifice, we have agreed to provide
Blenheim aircraft to the Turks, we should risk making them largely
ineffective by refusing to supply part of the essential
equipment. An embarrassed Air Ministry promised that it would
remove the missing items from RAF aircraft and send them by rail
on the Orient Express -- within two weeks. 264 Meanwhile, in
Turkey, Qakmak had rebuked his son-in-Iaw, the CAS, for commanding
a laughing-stock and was comparing British methods to poor
advantage with American and German practice. 265

Conclusion:
In January 1940, finally, the Western Allies had been brought
to make a financial arrangement which might, over time, have
permitted the Turks to wage war at their side -- ten months after
the joint guarantee, five months after the outbreak of war, four
months before the possibility of effective cooperation wouId cease
to exist. It is important to note, however, that the cash figures
and repayment schedules and schemes agreed upon remained almost
entirely abstract in our period due to Allied inability and
unwil1ingness to deliver the weapons which the Turks wished to
purchase. Initially, the question of finance had hampered supply~
1atterly, the problem of supply undermined the agreed financial
provisions. In the end, the Service Ministries proved to be as
reluctant to part with material as the Treasury had been to part
with money. Yet, without adequate provision of material assistance,
a financial arrangement to permit purchase, and an economic
arrangement to finance repayment, the alliance could have been
activated only with extreme difficulty whatever the military and
political constellation. without an economic arrangment which would
ensure its survival, Turkey could contemplate the prospect of an
active alliance with much less than complete sang froid. without
armaments it could not consider entering the war at aIl.
Unfortunately for Britain, while some greater effort at economic
assistance may have been possible, provision of military material
remained exceedingly difficult beyond the end of our period. Some
shift might be made to solve the economic question, but the problem
of supply continued to constitute a nearly absolute constraint."

If the Turkish archives were not secret we could read how happy the Turks really were about their "allies"...

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