pugsville wrote: ↑
01 Dec 2019 05:35
JAG13 wrote: ↑
30 Nov 2019 18:01
Lol! You are not serious, are you?
The UK first refused to take produce as payment for weapons demanding sterling instead, then demanded the Turks stop trading with Germany for weapons while refusing to buy the products they were selling to the Germans... then they finally agreed to give them a loan to buy weapons, but ONLY FROM THE UK, at which point they both, refused to sell them weapons since the UK lacked spare production and also refused to allow them to use the loan to buy from anyone else... cant tell you how thrilled the Turks were about UK support!
...and that was BEFORE Dunkirk.
Some weapons were promised in the end, mostly French, few arrived before the French collapse ended that particular soap opera.
Yeah, the Turks were very impressed on UK military prowess, kicked out of Norway, France, Greece, Libya and Crete, I am pretty sure the Turks would have been reassured that whatever few stragglers the UK could muster would make German/Soviet defeat a certainty...
Arms deliveries to the Turks. Yes more were promised and not delivered. But they dleeivered a greater percentages than teh German orders which were basically not delivered at all (pre war orders for me109s, submairnes)
Pre war amrs agreement 25 million pounds credit. A lot delivered after the Turks did not stand by the word of their treaty. Britian Delievred isgnificnat amounts of arms despite being desperate need for it;'s own defense.
2 Destroyers March 1941
2 Submarines in April 1942
2 minesweepers in dec 1939
2 minelayers in jan 1941
8 sub chasers in jan1941
10 MTBs june 1941
1000 mines April 1940
120 mines for submaines june 1941
500 depthcharges april 1940
82 torpedoes dec 1941
3 spitfires jan 1941
36 Blenheims may 1940
7 Lysanders april 1940
6 Avro Ansons may 1940
30 Fairly battles apr 1940
30 Hurricanes april 1940
30 Moprane Collenz 406a April 1940
1 Wellington jan 1941
24 240mm guns Aug 1939
190 25m ATG may 1940
24 Boffors AA guns 24 dec 1939
4 3.7 AA gun static may 1940
8 3.7 AA gun mobile April1940
24 155mm howitzers Aug 1939
12 105mm guns Aug 1939
18 pd guns may 1940
100 R,.35 tanks Aprl 1940
50 MkVIB light tanks feb 1940
12 Armored cars may 1940
200 Bots AT rifles sep 1939
5000 Hotchkiss LMGs sep 1939
1250 Vickers MGs feb 1940
25000 lebel rifles may 1940
500,000 grenades spring 1940
200 81mm Mortars spring 1940
400,000 gas marks.
Good, I see you finally looked at the sources I gave you, now put the "required" and "promised" columns as well to see how little it really was in context...
If the Brits didnt provide weapons TUrkey would need to go to the Germans for them, it wasnt "honor"...
"One last thing needs to be recorded under the rubric 'material
assistance'. Much of the material sent to the Turks, the British
were embarrassed to discover, arrived in non-servicable condition.
There were several reasons for this. One was the British practice
of shipping aIl material of a kind together without reference to
associated items. Thus, British guns would arrive in Turkey on one
ship, with the vessel carrying the tractors required to move them
some distance behind. 259 Even worse, fragile items, such as range
finders, gyroscopes, and vision equipment, arrived in boxes not
marked "fragile" (kolay kiril.ir) and were often broken by Turkish
Another problem with shipped material, was that in the haste
to get to the Turks those few things available, items were often
shipped incomplete. This was most catastrophically so in the case
of the Bristol Blenheims shipped to Turkey in 1939. First of all,
these Blenheims did not come with Beaufighter conversion kits. They
were Bombers, not Fighters as the Turks had wished. But even worse,
on arrival, it was discovered that these aircraft were not even
functional Bombers. Eighteen of the thirty lacked bomber seats,
bomb racks, and bomb winches. Twenty-eight had neither 250lb or
500lb bOmb racks. None of the aircraft had gun turrets, bomb
relea&es, sighting mechanism, machine-gun trigger sets, or oxygen
equipments. "It is most illogical and unsatisfactory" noted
Colville, "that when, at some sacrifice, we have agreed to provide
Blenheim aircraft to the Turks, we should risk making them largely
ineffective by refusing to supply part of the essential
equipment. An embarrassed Air Ministry promised that it would
remove the missing items from RAF aircraft and send them by rail
on the Orient Express -- within two weeks. 264 Meanwhile, in
Turkey, Qakmak had rebuked his son-in-Iaw, the CAS, for commanding
a laughing-stock and was comparing British methods to poor
advantage with American and German practice. 265
In January 1940, finally, the Western Allies had been brought
to make a financial arrangement which might, over time, have
permitted the Turks to wage war at their side -- ten months after
the joint guarantee, five months after the outbreak of war, four
months before the possibility of effective cooperation wouId cease
to exist. It is important to note, however, that the cash figures
and repayment schedules and schemes agreed upon remained almost
entirely abstract in our period due to Allied inability and
unwil1ingness to deliver the weapons which the Turks wished to
purchase. Initially, the question of finance had hampered supply~
1atterly, the problem of supply undermined the agreed financial
provisions. In the end, the Service Ministries proved to be as
reluctant to part with material as the Treasury had been to part
with money. Yet, without adequate provision of material assistance,
a financial arrangement to permit purchase, and an economic
arrangement to finance repayment, the alliance could have been
activated only with extreme difficulty whatever the military and
political constellation. without an economic arrangment which would
ensure its survival, Turkey could contemplate the prospect of an
active alliance with much less than complete sang froid. without
armaments it could not consider entering the war at aIl.
Unfortunately for Britain, while some greater effort at economic
assistance may have been possible, provision of military material
remained exceedingly difficult beyond the end of our period. Some
shift might be made to solve the economic question, but the problem
of supply continued to constitute a nearly absolute constraint."
If the Turkish archives were not secret we could read how happy the Turks really were about their "allies"...