Germany didn't have the logistical capability to supply a large enough army far enough east in order to seal off either the Caucasus or the northern lend lease route. Their OTL logistics weren't enough to keep their OTL armies supplied at their OTL distances. Believe it or not, the German high command actually knew what they were talking about when they said the Red Army needed to be destroyed west of the Dvina-Dnieper line. Anything beyond that range was beyond the ability of the poor roads and railroads of the Soviet Union to support.thaddeus_c wrote: ↑28 Nov 2019 14:20a quote from another thread
" Sealing off the "roof"of the Caucasus from the remainder of the Soviet Union, along with the existing possession of the Ukraine would have lost Stalin 70% of his coal,85-90% of his oil, and 50-60% of his food supply, along with large iron and manganese deposits ! He was SUNK! And the germans would have had a river based defense line they could hold. That this was THE WAR WINNER" viewtopic.php?f=66&t=78524&start=90
this was part of my point about clearing the Soviets from the Baltic and Black Seas, it relieves their own transportation problems, but also puts them right on top of key points.
in the north they would be on top of the major Lend Lease route for the critical first year.
Maybe the ideal Germany strategy was to stay to the west of the D-D line and hope Stalin was foolish enough to keep hurling all of his armies as far west as possible, which is basically what he did throughout the first year of the war. Germany mistakenly thought the Red Army would try to retreat into the Russian interior, when in fact it kept attacking to the west again and again.