One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

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MarkN
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by MarkN » 29 Nov 2019 16:49

Avalancheon wrote:
29 Nov 2019 05:30
Leaving aside the semantics for now, where are you getting your numbers from? You say that an encirclement of the Southwestern front couldn't net 600,000 men, because that is 3-4 times more troops than they had. Are you seriously implying that they only had 150,000 to 200,000 men? According to Robert Kirchubel [], Southwestern front had over 907,000 troops at the start of Barbarossa. Whether or not Army Group South could encircle 2/3rds of their forces is another matter, however.

''Kirponos commanded over 907,000 men. Three of his four armies and half of his eight mechanized corps defended the Lvov salient.'' -Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1): Army Group South By Robert Kirchubel.
:roll:

Please try to keep up if you can.

TheMarcksPlan clearly identifies the geographical boundaries and time frame for his imaginary encirclement.

Within that boundary and timeframe, historically speaking, alot less than 600,000 Soviets were there.

The fantasy encirclement proposed by TheMarcksPlan did not, l repeat DID NOT, envisage encircling the entire Southwestern Front.

If TheMarcksPlan fantasy narrative is to be considered credible, TheMarcksPlan needs to consider how significantly more Soviet troops came to be in the encirclement than were their historically. No problem. It's an fantasy narrative with a fantasy Heer so why not a fantasy Red Army too. TheMarcksPlan can easily make up the numbers above 600,000 to whatever he/she wants depending upon how much leakage he/she factors in. The problem then comes in trying to ascertain how that greater fantasy Red Army force affects the outcome of the battle. Should we all just assume a fantasy Heer against a fantasy Red Army gives the exact same result as in real life or the perfect result desired by TheMarcksPlan?

Historical numbers are based upon data presented by Isaev.

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JAG13
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by JAG13 » 30 Nov 2019 23:55

paulrward wrote:
24 Aug 2019 23:57
Hello All :

Mr. Ljadw's statement about the Turkish Army being short of rifles is, as they say, half right. What is true is that, starting in the early 1930s, the Turkish government had begun a program of refitting, re-barreling and chambering, and rationalization of the motley collection of rifles they had on hand ( some 500,000 rifles dating from as far back as the 1890s ) into what has been called the 'Turkish 1938 Pattern' short rifle. This included Gehwar 88s, Mauser 1890s, Mauser 1893s, Mauser K98s, and Mauser 1903s. This resulted in some 142,000 rifles being brought up to a fair degree of usability, with matching stocks, bayonets, slings, and using the same 8mm mauser ammunition.

In addition, starting just before the war, the government also went into production of Mauser copies at the K.Kale facility, with the result that, by the end of 1942, they had added some 113,000 more 8mm short mausers of the 1938 pattern, and by the end of the war, this figure had risen to over 240,000.

Finally, the Turks purchased a significant number of Czech Mausers during the 1930s, and these were brought to the standard design and issued to troops.

Thus, by the end 1942, the Turkish Army could have called on some 250,000 rifles, with another 130,000 over the next three years. That's about enough rifles to equip 15 divisions, or about five full corps of infantry.
IIRC the Turks also received 25.000 Lebels out of 100.000 promised by the French, and they claimed could mobilize 40 divisions but of course lacked the full equipment for that, even so, they had mobilized 1'300.000 men by March 1940.

Plus 5.000 Hotchkiss LMGs and 1.250 Vickers HMGs, logistics must have been fun...

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Avalancheon » 01 Dec 2019 07:12

MarkN wrote:
29 Nov 2019 16:49
:roll:

Please try to keep up if you can.

TheMarcksPlan clearly identifies the geographical boundaries and time frame for his imaginary encirclement.

Within that boundary and timeframe, historically speaking, alot less than 600,000 Soviets were there.

The fantasy encirclement proposed by TheMarcksPlan did not, l repeat DID NOT, envisage encircling the entire Southwestern Front.

If TheMarcksPlan fantasy narrative is to be considered credible, TheMarcksPlan needs to consider how significantly more Soviet troops came to be in the encirclement than were their historically. No problem.
The Southwestern front had alot of troops in reserve (particularly the mechanized corps), but they threw most of them at Panzer Group 1 near Brody. That resulted in a large concentration of Soviet troops near the border, who could be encircled by another Panzer Group striking out of Romania. Army Group South probably wouldn't capture 600,000 soldiers, true. But the number would be significantly larger than the 100,000 prisoners bagged at Uman.
MarkN wrote:
29 Nov 2019 16:49
It's an fantasy narrative with a fantasy Heer so why not a fantasy Red Army too. TheMarcksPlan can easily make up the numbers above 600,000 to whatever he/she wants depending upon how much leakage he/she factors in. The problem then comes in trying to ascertain how that greater fantasy Red Army force affects the outcome of the battle. Should we all just assume a fantasy Heer against a fantasy Red Army gives the exact same result as in real life or the perfect result desired by TheMarcksPlan?
More of the same dismissive language. You're starting to sound like a broken record.
MarkN wrote:
29 Nov 2019 16:49
Historical numbers are based upon data presented by Isaev.
Would you care to explain that?

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by pugsville » 01 Dec 2019 08:00

JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 23:55

IIRC the Turks also received 25.000 Lebels out of 100.000 promised by the French, and they claimed could mobilize 40 divisions but of course lacked the full equipment for that, even so, they had mobilized 1'300.000 men by March 1940.

Plus 5.000 Hotchkiss LMGs and 1.250 Vickers HMGs, logistics must have been fun...
The Hotchkiss was certainly re chambered for the standard Turkish Mauser cartridge as was the Vickers, near certainly the Lebels were as well.

https://www.ima-usa.com/products/origin ... 4297077829
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hotchkiss ... achine_gun

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by MarkN » 01 Dec 2019 13:43

Avalancheon wrote:
01 Dec 2019 07:12
The Southwestern front had alot of troops in reserve (particularly the mechanized corps), but they threw most of them at Panzer Group 1 near Brody. That resulted in a large concentration of Soviet troops near the border, who could be encircled by another Panzer Group striking out of Romania. Army Group South probably wouldn't capture 600,000 soldiers, true. But the number would be significantly larger than the 100,000 prisoners bagged at Uman.
TheMarcksPlan's narrative is pure fantasy despite his/her effort to conflate fact with fiction to lend substance to his/her imagination. TheMarcksPlan's fantasy Heer acts differently to the historical Heer. No doubt the fantasy Red Army would respond differently to the historical Red Army. TheMarcksPlan has speculated in some detail as to what his/her fantasy Heer would do; he/she has handwaved that the fantasy Red Army would lose 600,000 from the orbat.

And here is the kicker. That number, 600,000, is the only important thing to consider. How it is done is irrelevant. TheMarcksPlan has not bothered to present an explanation how 600,000 Soviet troops could become trapped and eliminated - just a handwave statement. TheMarcksPlan fantasy Heer creation and speculation on what they would do is just padding. Perhaps diversion or camouflage. The fantasy narrative is all about a Nazi victory. A fantasy victory that can only come about if 600,000 are removed from the orbat from the Southwestern Front within the first 10-14 days of the fantasy battle.

In the absence of any substance as to how the fantasy Red Army would accumulate a force in the encircled pocket so great that 600,000 get left behind, there is nothing to discuss other than to say the 600,000 itself is not credible.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by JAG13 » 01 Dec 2019 16:38

pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019 08:00
JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 23:55

IIRC the Turks also received 25.000 Lebels out of 100.000 promised by the French, and they claimed could mobilize 40 divisions but of course lacked the full equipment for that, even so, they had mobilized 1'300.000 men by March 1940.

Plus 5.000 Hotchkiss LMGs and 1.250 Vickers HMGs, logistics must have been fun...
The Hotchkiss was certainly re chambered for the standard Turkish Mauser cartridge as was the Vickers, near certainly the Lebels were as well.

https://www.ima-usa.com/products/origin ... 4297077829
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hotchkiss ... achine_gun
The British were sending 30'000.000 rounds of ammunition from the UK and India, unless they had a large stock of Mauser ammunition there (could be, weirder things) they would likely be sending 7,7mm, and the French were also offering Chatelleraults on 7,5mm, not in Mauser 8mm, plus the Lebel 8mm tubular magazine wouldnt interact well with Mauser ammo, packing tip to primer.

I know it could be made, I doubt it was made prior to shipping them...

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by JAG13 » 01 Dec 2019 17:28

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
10 Nov 2019 01:49
If Hitler accurately judges SU strength and American war-appetite, he'd not have pushed Japan towards the U.S. Instead, he'd have sought to channel Japan into his anti-SU war.

What levers were at his control? Here's my best version of the case:
Japan's war effort was - apart from China - largely parasitic on Germany's: they wouldn't have considered fighting UK/France/USA unless they expected Germany to do much of the work.
The Tripartite Pact guaranteed Axis support if the USA attacked Japan.
In IGHQ cabinet discussions of moves against Southeast Asia, there are multiple mentions of the "deterrent effect" of Germany/Axis on America, should it object to Japanese moves southwards. [anybody have cites at hand? I'm going off memory; I returned the relevant volume to the library].
Hitler's ultimate lever, therefore, is rescission of the Tripartite Pact if Japan doesn't attack the USSR. This would leave Japan to face the U.S. alone if it moves against SE Asia. Hitler's rationale could be that, while Article 5 of the Pact specifically disavows ill intent towards the SU, Stalin had since nullified those considerations by "provoking" Germany to attack it. Given Stalin's treachery, Japan's honor depended on joining her ally. Absent Japanese help with the SU, Germany would see no reason to stick its neck out and fight America.
Not even that, the US didnt attack Japan, it was the other way around, Japan went in and attacked on its own... what would have that needed to mean anything to Germany, wish Japan the best... let FDR try to find a way to justify siphoning billions of dollars and production capability away from the US war effort to subsidize an Empire and a Communist dictatorship.
Hitler's OTL strategy in the Balkans overall doesn't make sense given firm resolve to attack the SU; his Turkish position especially.
Re the Balkans, Hitler knew by December 1940 at the latest that he'd have to intervene but scheduled the operation too close to Barbarossa's intended jump-off. IMJ this reflects Hitler's equivocation and lack of clarity during this period. An earlier Operation Marita would have faced more weather difficulties but there's no way Greece/Yugoslavia stop the Heer in any weather. So why not do it earlier? IMJ a Hitler who viewed Barbarossa appropriately would have accepted sub-optimal Marita conditions to maximize Barbarossa's first-year impact. Only a Hitler who thinks Barbarossa is a cakewalk sacrifices a month of decent Russian weather to optimize Marita. So as a backdrop to a broader Russia/Turkey strategy, Hitler solves the Greece/Yugoslavia issue by March at the latest (Heer also gains valuable cold-weather experience as a result).
Hitler wanted to avoid an embarrassment at all costs, you dont fight on the mountains in bad weather... Yugoslavia got invaded due to a last minute revolution, not much you can do there.
So Stalin was thinking along the lines of a joint German-Italian-Soviet diplomatic/military action against Turkey but Hitler refused to go along. What a missed opportunity! The implications of such action could have been transformative in many ways. One paramount consideration would have been whether Stalin's course would have pushed Turkey into defensive alliance with the Allies - a real possibility. If that happens, however, and Hitler/Stalin seek a military solution, then the SU will be at war with the UK! That completely changes the nature of the war and entirely to Germany's favor. Even if Germany launches Barbarossa during UK-SU hostilities, there is very little chance of LL becoming a factor after UK and SU have killed a few thousand of the others' soldiers in, e.g., Persia. Or after Soviet submarines have torpedoed British merchant ships.
The treaty:

II. If Turkey became involved in war in the Mediterranean, then the UK and France would provide aIl the assistance in their power.

IV. In the event of war outside the Mediterranean, the powers would consult together. Turkey, in any case, would be at least benevolently neutral.

If its just the USSR and Germany, then IV applies and the UK is free to commit suicide by Stalin if they so choose, if Italy is in then the UK would have to decide whether Turkey's prior desertion means the treaty was broken anyway.
Or suppose that Hitler simply tells Stalin he won't oppose any moves against Turkey but doesn't want to get involved because he doesn't want to push the Turks into UK arms and thereby set up RAF to bomb Ploesti. The Russians invade; if Britain goes to war against SU then we're back at a nightmare scenario for the Allies.

Whatever the details of Stalin getting most of what he wanted from Turkey with Hitler's help/acquiescence, Hitler could have extracted a pound of flesh from Stalin in exchange. Maybe 2mil tons of oil? Whatever the case it's icing on the cake to bringing Turkey on side and/or tying RKKA down and/or alienating the Brits and Russians from each other.
Or you could publish the allies plans for Pike, watch the Soviets go ballistic and demand Kars and Ardahan (as it happened IRL), and then go to the Turks first and offer an Axis membership card explaining that they had already been restraining the Soviets and Italians since 1939 but, out of respect for their joint struggle in ww1 they preferred to be allies, if they are not interested, well... allies before roadkill.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by JAG13 » 01 Dec 2019 17:40

Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2019 02:40
You also need to read USSBS Report No. 77 German Motor Vehicles Industry Report and No. 78 German Tank Industry Report. There was no "simply" about it. Yes, Adam-Opel at Russelheim and the Wolfsburg plant were designed for mass-production, but they were the only ones that were. Insofar as I have been able to determine, none of the German tank assembly plants, even the most modern one built as the Nibelungenwerk were designed for mass production. Wolfsburg was designed and built to manufacture 800-kg passenger vehicles and was not suited to building 44.8 tonne tanks. Ditto Russelheim, a 2.1 tonne truck is not a 44.8 tonne tank.

And before you say "but Americans built tanks by mass production in automobile plants", no they did not. They built them in purpose-built tank arsenals that were run by auto manufacturers and in heavy machinery plants - like locomotive works - like the Germans did.
But wasnt Nibelungenwerk designed for the PzIV and produced most of the PzIVs in spite of opening in 1942?

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Dec 2019 19:11

JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019 17:40
But wasnt Nibelungenwerk designed for the PzIV and produced most of the PzIVs in spite of opening in 1942?
The Nibelungenwerk was the largest and most advanced tank assembly plant of the German Reich. The plant, which was run by Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG, manufactured over half of all Panzer IV tanks produced by Germany during World War II. After the annexation of Austria in 1938, the Heereswaffenamt planned the construction of an armaments center near Linz. It would include manufacture of armor plate at Eisenwerke Oberdonau and a plant for final assembly of tanks near Sankt Valentin. Initially, 65 million Reichsmarks were earmarked for the new Sankt Valentin plant. On 23 February 1940, the Oberkommando des Heeres ordered construction of the plant at Thurnsdorf near St. Valentin and formally named it the Nibelungenwerk. The order allocated up to 78,288,000 Reichsmarks for its construction. By September 1940 enough of the plant was complete that it began rebuilding damaged Panzer III tanks, but the official opening took place in 1942. When completed, the monthly production capacity was intended to be 320 tanks, but this was never achieved.

The total plant area was 123.5 acres with 861,113 square feet (80,000 square meters) of floor space in buildings. The plant was heavily bombed and by the end of the war about 50% of the floor space was destroyed or damaged. During the Soviet occupation of Austria, the remaining machine tools were removed from the plant and shipped to the USSR.

By fall 1941, about 4,800 workers were at the Nibeungenwerk. By the end of 1944 there were 8,500, including prisoners of war and forced labor from France, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the USSR. About 600 to 1,500 of the workers were from the Mauthausen concentration camp.

All early models of Panzer IV were manufactured by Krupp but from the Ausf F production was extended to Nibelungenwerk and later also included Vomag. In December 1941 Krupp’s factory was diverted to manufacture the Sturmgeschütz IV, and in the spring of 1944 the Vomag factory began production of the Jagdpanzer IV, leaving Nibelungenwerk as the only plant still assembling the Panzer IV.

Nibelungen completed its first Panzer IV from parts produced by Krupp in November 1941 - one of them in the month. From November 1941-October 1942 it completed an average of 9.3 Panzer IV per month. From November 1942 to October 1943 an average of 94 per month. From Noevember 1943 to October 1944 226.8 per month.

In contrast, the Detroit Tank Arsenal completed 7 Medium Tanks M3 its first month of operation in July 1941 and averaged 241.7 per month over the next 12 months. It completed its last full month of M3 production in July 1942 with 317 as it transitioned to building the Medium Tank M4, completing 2. In August it completed its M3 production, 26, and 167 M4. It averaged 543.1 medium tanks completed per month July 1942-June 1943. From July 1943 to June 1944 it completed an average of 342.3 per month as production contracts were reduced and it branched out to produce multiple types (M4 "Composite", M4 105mm, M4A3 105mm, and M4A3 76mm) and so on. From July 1944-June 1945 they averaged 360.6 per month, albeit M4A3 105mm production ended in April and M4A3 76mm production ended in May. Instead, 251 T26E3/T26E5 were completed March-June 1945.

AFAICT, Nibelungen utilized partly assembly-line and partly station manufacturing methods and had essentially a single "line". DTA used true assembly-line methods, with three parallel lines in operation initially (why the switchover to the M4 was so quickly accomplished) and eventually at peak in late 1942 and through 1943 up to five lines running simultaneously.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by JAG13 » 01 Dec 2019 19:23

Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019 19:11

AFAICT, Nibelungen utilized partly assembly-line and partly station manufacturing methods and had essentially a single "line". DTA used true assembly-line methods, with three parallel lines in operation initially (why the switchover to the M4 was so quickly accomplished) and eventually at peak in late 1942 and through 1943 up to five lines running simultaneously.
Thx, I will never understand why didnt thy simply adopt Junkers takt time mass production methods across the board.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Dec 2019 20:16

JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019 19:23
Thx, I will never understand why didnt thy simply adopt Junkers takt time mass production methods across the board.
I suspect because except for Nibelungen the German tank plants were all conversions of other heavy manufacturing plants. DTA and its companion, the Fisher Grand Blanc Tank Arsenal were built from the ground up as tank arsenals. Some of the other converted plants, even though they were intended for mass production assembly-line style, did not do as well. Baldwin Locomotive built M4 and M4A2, but in 16 months of assembling them its peak 12-month average was just over 101. Lima Locomotive was slightly better, but enjoyed the benefits of the British paying for renovation of an unused plant building as a tank assembly hall (originally intended to produce Grant tanks). they managed 114.7 per month at peak. ALCO managed 181.2, Pullman Car did better, just over 211 per month at peak, and Pressed Steel Car did best at about 232.5 per month. The worst was the small contract to Federal Machine and Welder, which only managed 47.5 over its 13-month run. Even Ford only was able to complete 194.8 over its 14-month run (including M10A1) before turning exclusively to producing tank engines.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by JAG13 » 01 Dec 2019 21:13

Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019 20:16
I suspect because except for Nibelungen the German tank plants were all conversions of other heavy manufacturing plants.
Sure, but that would be the point, a new assembly plant designed around takt time principles and in turn feed by the old factories that built parts or sub-assemblies.

The Germans financed the construction of many factories, they could have easily imposed their design ideas.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Dec 2019 21:29

JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019 21:13
Sure, but that would be the point, a new assembly plant designed around takt time principles and in turn feed by the old factories that built parts or sub-assemblies.

The Germans financed the construction of many factories, they could have easily imposed their design ideas.
I agree, it is inexplicable, but it is also fact. Even though Nibelungenwerk was supposedly built to mass-produce tanks assembly-line fashion, it never achieved the production rate it was supposedly designed for. I suspect part of the problem was the Panzer IV itself...much of its evolution was intended to make it easier to produce while keeping weight increase down. That may have clashed with the mass-production objective.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by pugsville » 02 Dec 2019 03:55

JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019 16:38
pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019 08:00
JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019 23:55

IIRC the Turks also received 25.000 Lebels out of 100.000 promised by the French, and they claimed could mobilize 40 divisions but of course lacked the full equipment for that, even so, they had mobilized 1'300.000 men by March 1940.

Plus 5.000 Hotchkiss LMGs and 1.250 Vickers HMGs, logistics must have been fun...
The Hotchkiss was certainly re chambered for the standard Turkish Mauser cartridge as was the Vickers, near certainly the Lebels were as well.

https://www.ima-usa.com/products/origin ... 4297077829
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hotchkiss ... achine_gun
The British were sending 30'000.000 rounds of ammunition from the UK and India, unless they had a large stock of Mauser ammunition there (could be, weirder things) they would likely be sending 7,7mm, and the French were also offering Chatelleraults on 7,5mm, not in Mauser 8mm, plus the Lebel 8mm tubular magazine wouldnt interact well with Mauser ammo, packing tip to primer.

I know it could be made, I doubt it was made prior to shipping them...
I have provided a source of Turkish contract vickers converted to Mauser.

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RE: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Robert Rojas » 02 Dec 2019 13:06

Greetings to both brother Richard Anderson and the community as a whole. Howdy Richard! Well sir, in reference to your posting of Sunday - December 01, 2019 - 12:29pm, old yours truly is likely going out of my technical depth on this subject, BUT I have been wondering how the impact of Depot Maintenance may have had on the armored fighting vehicle production rate with the Nibellungenwerk and other such similar manufacturing facilities. After all, the repair and rehabilitation of battle damaged and simply worn out machinery would undoubtedly pull technicians away from the production line and take up vital floor space on the factory floor. Needless to say, the demands of the front would also impact the prioritization of both vehicle production and Depot Maintenance repair rates. Am I off base here? Well, that's my initial two Yankee cents worth on this sojourn into the logisitical peculiarities of the war time industrial state - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day up in your corner of the woods of the Evergreen State of Washington.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
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